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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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20 January 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report, 19 January

1. Tunisia: Prospects for Further Unrest. The community representatives agreed that the government probably has sufficient time to meet the kinds of economic grievances that sparked the recent riots. There was general agreement, however, that the government -- [REDACTED] leery of imposing austerity measures on the middle class -- may not move quickly enough in the near term and that we may see further unrest in Tunisia, perhaps as early as the spring.

Two key determinants in the government's ability to deal with future unrest are the army's attitudes and the status of President Bourguiba. The army performed well in an internal security role and army morale is high. We are not, however, sure the army would enjoy prolonged police-type duties. Moreover, it is likely that senior officers will begin to demand a larger political say if they are called on to continue a major internal security role. Bourguiba played a key role in defusing the recent unrest. If he dies or is incapacitated when unrest breaks out again, we believe his absence would hinder efforts to bring it under control.

2. Iran-Iraq: Developments. There are a number of new developments since our last warning meeting:

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b. Iranian Suicide Attacks on US Naval Targets:

Analysts saw little reason for Iran to want to directly attack the US now -- although all agreed that attacks through surrogates will continue -- or to take action that would certainly lead to the closure of the Straits of Hormuz. Analysts felt that the Iranians are more likely to continue with incremental responses and some analysts felt that the reports might indicate Iranian preparations for responding to a US attack on Iran, which Tehran sees as increasingly likely.

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3. Lebanon: New Trends in Terrorism. AUB President Kerr's assassination confirms the trend towards individual terrorist attacks on nationals and diplomats from MNF contributing countries. MNF precautions against suicide car bomb attacks may well have convinced the terrorist groups -- and we believe that radical Shia backed by Iran are responsible for the attacks -- to switch targets. Terrorists will now focus on small, individual targets, use small arms -- silencer-equipped pistols -- and hit and run type attacks. MNF soldiers will continue to be targets.

One analysts suggested that the contrast between the kidnapping last year of AUB President Dodge -- who was subsequently released -- and the assassination of Kerr might indicate growing differences between the radical Shia and Syria. Some evidence suggests the radical Shia who kidnapped Dodge had wanted to try and execute him but were apparently prevented from doing so by Syria, which arranged his release. The radicals, fearing Syria might do the same thing again, decided to kill Kerr directly. Analysts agreed that there might be differences between Syria and the radicals but that we did not have enough convincing evidence to say with certainty that such splits existed.

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